All-Pay Auctions with Endogenous Rewards

This paper examines a perfectly discriminating contest (all-pay auction) with two asymmetric players. Valuations are endogenous and depend on the effort each player invests in the contest. The shape of the valuation function is common knowledge and differs between the contestants. Some key properties of R&D races, lobbying activity and sport contests are captured by this framework. Once the unique equilibrium in mixed strategies analyzed, we derive a closed form of the expected expenditure of both players. We characterize the expected expenditure by means of incomplete Beta functions. We focus on unordered valuations.All-pay auctions, contests

All-pay auctions with endogenous rewards

This paper examines a perfectly discriminating contest (all-pay auction) with two asymmetric players. Valuations are endogenous and depend on the effort each player invests in the contest. The shape of the valuation function is common knowledge and differs between the contestants. Some key properties of R&D races, lobbying activity and sport contests are captured by this framework. Once the unique equilibrium in mixed strategies analyzed, we derive a closed form of the expected expenditure of both players. We characterize the expected expenditure by the means of incomplete Beta functions. We focus on unordered valuations.all-pay auctions, contests

A Multinomial Model of Fertility Choice and Offspring Sex-Ratios in India

Fertility decline in developing countries may have unexpected demographic consequences. Although lower fertility improves nutrition, health, and human capital investments for surviving children, little is known about the relationship between fertility outcomes and female-male offspring sex-ratios. Particularly in countries with a cultural preference for sons, like India and China, fertility decline may deteriorate the already imbalanced sex-ratios. We use the fertility histories of over 90,000 Indian women in the Second National Family and Health Survey to investigate the relationship between fertility choices and offspring sex-ratios in India. Both within- and between-family-size differences in offspring sex-ratios are examined. Our analysis reveals three main findings. First, within-family-size differences show that for our reference household (i.e. non-low-caste Hindus), parental education reduces anti-female bias in survival in large families (three or more children households) but plays no role in small families (one or two children households). While a higher standard of living worsens anti-female bias in survival in both large and small families, it does so to a greater extent in small families. Small families that own land also have lower offspring sex-ratios compared to landless households. Second, between-family-size differences indicate an `intensification' effect, whereby small families have dramatically lower offspring sex-ratios than large families. The intensification effect is greatest for Sikh and non-low-caste Hindu households, followed by low-caste Hindu and Christian households, but does not exist for Muslims. Third, while maternal education and urban residence weaken the intensification effect, paternal education, a higher standard of living, and land ownership strengthen it. Our results suggest that fertility decline, together with economic growth, may worsen India's already imbalanced sex-ratios. Thus, much needed fertility control policies must be supplemented with programs that counter offspring sex-selection in favor of sons. Policies that seek to eradicate son preference by making daughters more economically attractive to parents as well as those that imbibe more gender-equal attitudes within individuals are critically needed as economic growth generates higher levels of education and wealth in India.Female Disadvantage, Mortality, Son Preference, Fertility, India

India's Missing Women: Disentangling Cultural, Political and Economic Variables

The severe anti-female bias in natality and child mortality that gives rise to India's missing women has been widely documented and various explanations ranging from agricultural labor demand to dowries have been offered in the literature. In general, the low demand for girls has been interpreted as a rational response to economic constraints. This paper shows the importance of culture both in determining the value of girls and in shaping parental economic constraints. We find that conservative cultural attitudes, proxied by the electoral success of religious parties, are positively correlated with anti-female bias. Moreover, higher household expenditure is negatively correlated with the number of girls. This suggests that we cannot rely on rising income levels, brought about by economic growth, to improve the demographic disadvantage faced by Indian women. Our policy recommendations therefore focus on changing attitudes of son-preference that motivate anti-female bias as much as enforcement of gender-equality legislation.Female Disadvantage, Mortality, Son Preference, India

India’s Missing Women: Disentangling Cultural, Political and Economic Variables

The severe anti-female bias in natality and child mortality that gives rise to India’s missing women has been widely documented and various explanations ranging from agricultural labor demand to dowries have been offered in the literature. In general, the low demand for girls has been interpreted as a rational response to economic constraints. This paper shows the importance of culture both in determining the value of girls and in shaping parental economic constraints. We find that conservative cultural attitudes, proxied by the electoral success of religious parties, is positively correlated with anti-female bias. Moreover, higher household expenditure is negatively correlated with the number of girls. This suggests that we cannot rely on rising income levels, brought about by economic growth, to improve the demographic disadvantage faced by Indian women. Our policy recommendations therefore focus on changing attitudes of son-preference that motivate anti-female bias as much as enforcement of gender-equality legislation.

full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. India’s missing women: disentangling cultural, political and

economic variables

All-Pay Auctions with Polynomial Rewards

This paper examines a perfectly discriminating contest (all-pay auction) with two asymmetric players. We focus on unordered valuations. Valuations are endogenous (polynomial functions) and depend on the effort each player invests in the contest. The shape of the valuation function is common knowledge and differs between the contestants. Some key properties of R&D races, lobbying activity and sport contests are captured by this framework. After analyzing the unique mixed strategy equilibrium, we derive a closed form of the expected expenditure of both players. We characterize the expected expenditure by means of incomplete Beta functions

Risk and Unraveling in Labor Markets

A two period labor market is considered in which workers’ quality is revealed in the second period. A signal – revealed to either workers, firms or both at the beginning of the first period – is correlated with the final quality. Under all assumptions about the distribution of information in the first period there exists an equilibrium in which firms only make offers in the second period and workers accept no offer in the first period. Nonetheless, early contracting is also an equilibrium if certain conditions on preferences of firms and workers are met. Workers have to be risk averse or firms risk loving with respect to expectations appropriate to the relevant information structure. Thus the conditions for unraveling depend on the information available to the two sides of the market

All-Pay Auctions with Polynomial Rewards

This paper examines a perfectly discriminating contest (all-pay auction) with two asymmetric players. We focus on unordered valuations. Valuations are endogenous (polynomial functions) and depend on the effort each player invests in the contest. The shape of the valuation function is common knowledge and differs between the contestants. Some key properties of R&D races, lobbying activity and sport contests are captured by this framework. After analyzing the unique mixed strategy equilibrium, we derive a closed form of the expected expenditure of both players. We characterize the expected expenditure by means of incomplete Beta functions

Risk and Unraveling in Labor Markets

A two period labor market is considered in which workers’ quality is revealed in the second period. A signal – revealed to either workers, firms or both at the beginning of the first period – is correlated with the final quality. Under all assumptions about the distribution of information in the first period there exists an equilibrium in which firms only make offers in the second period and workers accept no offer in the first period. Nonetheless, early contracting is also an equilibrium if certain conditions on preferences of firms and workers are met. Workers have to be risk averse or firms risk loving with respect to expectations appropriate to the relevant information structure. Thus the conditions for unraveling depend on the information available to the two sides of the market